Intrusion detection system alert correlation with operating system level logs by Toprak, Mustafa
  
 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM ALERT 
CORRELATION WITH OPERATING SYSTEM 
LEVEL LOGS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
The Graduate School of Engineering and Sciences of 
İzmir Institute of Technology 
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 
MASTER OF SCIENCE 
 
in Computer Software 
 
 
 
by 
Mustafa TOPRAK 
 
 
 
 
 
December 2009 
İzmir 
  
 
We approve the thesis of Mustafa TOPRAK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
Prof. Dr. Sıtkı AYTAÇ 
Supervisor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
Assist. Prof. Dr. Tuğkan TUĞLULAR 
Committee Member 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_______________________________ 
Prof. Dr. Şaban EREN 
Committee Member 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 December 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
______________________________ 
Prof. Dr. Sıtkı AYTAÇ 
Head of the Department of 
Computer Engineering 
_________________________________ 
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Talat YALÇIN 
Dean of the Graduate School of 
Engineering and Sciences 
 
 iii
ABSTRACT 
 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM ALERT CORRELATION WITH 
OPERATING SYSTEM LEVEL LOGS 
 
Internet is a global public network. More and more people are getting connected 
to the Internet every day to take advantage of the Internetwork connectivity. It also 
brings in a lot of risk on the Internet because there are both harmless and harmful users 
on the Internet. While an organization makes its information system available to 
harmless Internet users, at the same time the information is available to the malicious 
users as well. Most organizations deploy firewalls to protect their private network from 
the public network. But, no network can be hundred percent secured. This is because; 
the connectivity requires some kind of access to be granted on the internal systems to 
Internet users. The firewall provides security by allowing only specific services through 
it. The firewall implements defined rules to each packet reaching to its network 
interface. The IDS complements the firewall security by detected if someone tries to 
break in through the firewall or manages to break in the firewall security and tried to 
have access on any system in the trusted site and alerted the system administrator in 
case there is a breach in security. However, at present, IDSs suffer from several 
limitations. To address these limitations and learn network security threats, it is 
necessary to perform alert correlation. 
Alert correlation focuses on discovering various relationships between 
individual alerts. Intrusion alert correlation techniques correlate alerts into meaningful 
groups or attack scenarios for ease to understand by human analysts. In order to be sure 
about the alert correlation working properly, this thesis proposed to use attack scenarios 
by correlating alerts on the basis of prerequisites and consequences of intrusions. The 
architecture of the experimental environment based on the prerequisites and 
consequences of different types of attacks, the proposed approach correlates alerts by 
matching the consequence of some previous alerts and the prerequisite of some later 
ones with OS-level logs. As a result, the accuracy of the proposed method and its 
advantage demonstrated to focus on building IDS alert correlation with OS-level logs in 
information security systems.  
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ÖZET 
 
SALDIRI TESPİT SİSTEMİ ALARMLARININ İŞLETİM SİSTEMİ LOG 
KAYITLARI İLE KORELASYONU 
 
İnternet genel bir küresel ağdır. Giderek daha çok insan internete bağlı olmanın 
avantajlarından faydalanmaktadır. Ancak internet faydanın yanında birçok riski de 
beraberinde getirmektedir. Çünkü hem zararsız hem de zararlı kullanıcılar internete 
bağlı durumdadır. Herhangi bir özel ağ internet erişimine açıldığında, zararsız 
kullanıcılar yanında kötü niyetli kullanıcılara da sistem açılmış olur. Birçok 
organizasyon kendi özel ağını genel ağdan ayrımak için güvenlik duvarlarını 
kullanmaktadır. Ancak güvenlik duvarları bir ağı yüzde yüz güvenli kılmaz. Bunun ana 
nedeni, genel ağ ile özel ağ arasında bazı erişim haklarının verilmesinden 
kaynaklanmaktadır. Güvenlik duvarı sadece belirli servislere erişim hakları 
tanımlayarak ağ güvenliğini sağlamaktadır. Güvenlik duvarı üzerinde tanımlı kural 
setlerine göre ağ paketlerinin erişimine izin verir. Bu noktada saldırı tespit sistemleri 
güvenlik duvarının oluşturduğu ağ güvenliğini tamamlamaktadır. Eğer bir ağ kullanıcısı 
güvenlik duvarını kırmaya ya da özel ağdaki bir sistemi kontrol etmeye çalışırsa; saldırı 
tespit sistemi saldırı ile ilgili olarak sistem yöneticisini uyarır. Bununla beraber saldırı 
tespit sistemlerinin bazı kısıtları da vardır. Bu kısıtları belirlemek ve ağ güvenliğini 
tehdit eden faaliyetleri öğrenmek için saldırı tespit sistemi alarmları korelasyona tabi 
tutulur. 
Alarm korelasyonu saldırı tespit sistemi alarmları arasındaki ilişkileri ortaya 
çıkarmaya odaklanmaktadır. Saldırı alarmları için korelasyon teknikleri alarmları ve 
saldırı senaryolarını kullanıcıları için anlamlı ve kolay anlaşılır hale getirmektedir. 
Alarm korelasyonunun doğru çalıştığına emin olmak için bu tez çalışması saldırı 
senaryolarını kullanıp, üretilen alarmları saldırı önkoşul ve sonuçlarına dayanarak 
korelasyona tabi tutar. Deney ortamının mimarisi çeşitli saldırıların önkoşul ve 
sonuçlarına dayanarak, alarmları bir önceki alarmın sonucu ve bir sonraki alarmın da 
nedeni olarak belirleyip; işletim sistemi kayıtları ile eşleştirmektedir. Sonuç olarak ele 
alınan yöntemin kesinliği ve faydaları, saldırı tespit sistemi alarmlarının işletim sistemi 
kayıtları ile korelasyonu sonucunda gösterilmiştir.       
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Intrusion detection techniques can be roughly classified into two categories: 
misuse detection and anomaly detection. To perform misuse detection, a repository of 
all known attack patterns is necessary. Misuse detection systems examine security 
events to see whether they match these attack patterns. If they are, the corresponding 
security events are flagged as attacks. To perform anomaly detection, a repository of 
normal behaviors for each entity is usually necessary. Anomaly detection systems 
monitor each entity’s activity, and once they find an entity’s behavior significantly 
deviates from the normal profile, an alert is generated (Xu and Ning 2006). 
Many IDSs have been designed, implemented and deployed into networks (Xu 
and Ning 2006). They are a line of defense to protect digital assets. Though many novel 
designs and improvements have been proposed, at present, IDSs still suffer from a few 
drawbacks: 
• IDSs may flag thousands of alerts every day, thus overwhelming security 
officers. 
• Among all the alerts reported by IDSs, false alerts (false positives) are 
mixed with true alerts. In addition, it is very possible that a large 
percentage of alerts are false alerts. This may make the alert investigation 
very challenging. 
• At present, IDSs cannot guarantee the detection of all attacks. In other 
words, they may miss some attacks, which could be critical for security 
officers to understand the current security threats. 
These limitations of IDSs make security investigation not only time-consuming, 
but also error-prone. It is very challenging for security officers to fully learn the security 
threats in their networks as well as over the Internet. 
To address these challenges, various alert correlation techniques have been 
proposed in recent years. To help us better understand these alert correlation methods 
which roughly classified into four categories: 
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1. The approaches based on similarity between alert attributes: These 
approaches can group alerts through computing attribute similarity 
values. 
2. The techniques based on predefined attack scenarios: These techniques 
construct attack scenarios through matching alerts to predefined scenario 
templates. 
3. The methods based on prerequisites and consequences of attacks: These 
methods build attack scenarios through matching the consequences of 
earlier attacks with the prerequisite of later attacks. 
4. The approaches based on multiple information sources: These 
approaches provide frameworks to model different types of information 
and may further perform reasoning based on IDS alerts and other 
information. 
Several researchers investigated integrating additional information sources into 
alert correlation to improve its quality (Zhai, et al. 2006). These approaches can 
improve the performance of correlation by integrating different sources of security-
related information. However, the correlation results are still not yet satisfactory (Zhai, 
et al. 2006). This thesis purposes to harness OS-level event logging and dependency 
tracking to improve the accuracy of alert correlation. It tracks dependency causing 
events such as process forking and file operations in the system event log, and spans up 
a tree of system objects connected by these events from the target object.  
The Coral8 complex event processing engine is integrated with IDS alerts and 
OS-level dependency tracking logs via Coral8 input adapters in comma separated value 
files format. This integration method based on the following observations: Firstly, most 
attacks have corresponding operations on specific OS-level objects. Secondly, other 
than a few exceptions, if one attack prepares for another, the later attack’s 
corresponding operations would be dependent on the earlier one’s. Coral8 performs 
user-defined SQL based correlation methods which based on the above and produces 
the correlated alerts to security officers. 
The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows: In chapter 2, intrusion 
detection systems (IDSs) are defined, the classification of IDSs is provided. Also it 
contains the information about the detection methods of IDSs and their response after 
detecting an intrusion. Chapter 3 defines Coral8 complex event processing tool and their 
properties and includes some Coral8 queries to execute some correlation examples for 
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some special scenarios. Chapter 4 discusses intrusion alert correlation and its techniques 
with some examples. Chapter 5 surveys an alert correlation scenario for the technique of 
prerequisite and consequence approaches. A custom structure has also been built to 
investigate the correlation method with some metric values in the alert correlation 
scenario. In Chapter 6, conclusion is processed along with future work. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM 
 
The Internet is a global public network. With the growth of the Internet and its 
potential, there has been subsequent change in business model of organizations across 
the world. More and more people are getting connected to the Internet every day to take 
advantage of the new business model popularly known as e-business. Internetwork 
connectivity has therefore become very critical aspect of today’s e-business. 
 There are two sides of business on the Internet. On one side, the Internet brings 
in tremendous potential to business in terms of reaching the end users. At the same time 
it also brings in a lot of risk to the business (Sans 2001). There are both harmless and 
harmful users on the Internet. While an organization makes its information system 
available to harmless Internet users, at the same time the information is available to the 
malicious users as well. Complete physical isolation of the information system from all 
possible suspicious users would be a simple and effective way of denying possible risks, 
but it may be unacceptable because the physical isolation may render the information 
system unable to perform its intended function. 
Network security technology is very important to avoid security risks. There are 
several techniques and tools that are used to provide network security. Network security 
aims is confidentiality, integrity and availability of data so providing this aim firewalls 
are one of the well-known tools that are very helpful in network security. Basically, a 
firewall separates the private network from the external and non-secure environment. A 
firewall that is located between the private network and Internet enforces a predefined 
network security policy by controlling network traffic passing over it. A network 
security policy is composed of a set of rules that defines what types of connections are 
allowed between internal and external networks. Additionally, a security policy defines 
the action that should be performed when a violation of policy is detected (Erdogan 
2008). 
Different organizations across the world deploy firewalls to protect their private 
network from the public network. But, when it comes to securing a private network 
from the Internet using firewalls, no network can be hundred percent secured. This is 
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because; the business requires some kind of access to be granted on the internal systems 
to Internet users. The firewall provides security by allowing only specific services 
through it. The firewall implements a policy for allowing or disallowing connections 
based on organizational security policy and business needs. The firewall also protects 
the organization from malicious attack from the Internet by dropping connections from 
unknown sources. 
 
2.1. The Definition of an IDS and Its Need 
 
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring and searching networks of 
computers and systems for security policy violations (Bace 2000). IDSs are software 
and hardware products that automate this monitoring and analysis process. An IDS 
inspects all inbound and outbound network activity, system logs and events, and 
identifies suspicious patterns or events that may indicate a network or system attack 
from someone attempting to break into or compromise a system (Webopedia 2002).  
 The question is, where does an IDS fit in the design. Theoretically, IDSs work 
like a burglar alarm. For example, the lock system in a car protects the car from theft. 
But if somebody breaks the lock system and tries to steal the car, it is the burglar alarm 
that detects that the lock has been broken and alerts the owner by raising an alarm. 
IDS complements the firewall security in a similar way. The firewall protects an 
organization from malicious attacks from the Internet and the IDS detects if someone 
tries to break in through the firewall or manages to break in the firewall security and 
tries to have access on any system in the trusted side and alerts the system administrator 
in case there is a breach in security. It is also assumed that most IDSs attempt to detect 
suspected intrusion and they alert the system administrator that an attack may be taking 
place so that they can respond accordingly. 
IDSs have gained acceptance as a necessary addition to every organization’s 
security infrastructure. The organizations have several compelling reasons to acquire 
and use IDSs. Some of them are listed below (Bace and Mell 2001): 
• To prevent problematic behaviors by increasing the perceived risk of 
discovery and punishment for those who would attack or otherwise abuse 
the system, 
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• To detect attacks and other security violations that are not prevented by 
other security measures, 
• To detect and deal with the preambles to attacks (commonly experienced 
as network probes and other reconnaissance activities), 
• To document the existing threat to an organization, 
• To act as quality control tool for security design and administration, 
especially for large and complex enterprises, 
• To provide useful information about intrusions that take place, allowing 
detailed analysis, recovery, and correction of causative factors. 
Therefore, an IDS is a security system that monitors computer systems and 
network traffic and analyzes that traffic for possible hostile attacks originating from 
outside the organization and also for system misuse or attacks originating from inside 
the organization. 
 
2.2. IDS Terminology 
 
Alert/alarm: A signal suggesting a system has been or is being attacked. 
Undetected bad traffic (false negative): Failure to identify malicious traffic as 
an attack. This is the worst thing that can happen, because it means the IDS failed to do 
its job. Failing to detect an attack can occur when an IDS does not have adequate or 
comprehensive intrusion detection mechanisms in place. It also occurs when new 
attacks are created and then missed by poorly implemented detection mechanisms 
(OneSecure 2001). While it is virtually impossible to detect every attack, the goal of 
any system should be to minimize the number of undetected attacks. 
Detected bad traffic (true negative): Identifying “real attacks” as an attack. 
This is the ideal result of an IDS. The ability to detect bad traffic with speed and 
reliability is referred to as intrusion detection accuracy. All other functions of the 
system hinge on this capability (OneSecure 2001). The more accurate the system, the 
more trusted its abilities. A system must have proven accuracy before enabling it to take 
the necessary actions (such as dropping the connection) to the secure network. 
Identifying good traffic as an attack (false positive – false alarm): False 
alarm or false positive. This is the most troublesome and time-consuming aspect of IDS 
solutions. It occurs when the IDS sees something in legitimate and benign traffic that 
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makes it believe there is an attack (OneSecure 2001). It is detrimental because each and 
every alarm needs to be investigated in order to determine whether an attack was 
successful and assess any resulting damage. Every moment spent investigating a false 
positive reduces the time available to investigate real threats. The result is that false 
positives can erode trust in the product; sometimes causing real attack alarms to be 
overlooked (the “crying wolf” effect). Most IDSs can be tuned to try to reduce the 
occurrence of false positives, however, the tuning process is often long and involved, 
sometimes taking weeks to accomplish (OneSecure 2001). In addition, because of the 
management design of current IDSs, tuning is often an all or nothing approach. This 
means that security managers must choose whether or not to look for a certain attack. If, 
in the interest of reducing false positives, the detection of certain attacks is turned 
completely “off”, those attacks will be able to go by the IDS completely undetected. 
Nevertheless, false positives are not the result of poor software design by IDS 
vendors. As Stefan Axelsson demonstrated in his 1999 ACM presentation (Axelsson 
1999), there are some fundamental mathematical constraints that make false positives 
endemic to the whole paradigm of real-time signature (pattern) recognition. Deviations 
from baseline norms can be caused by a variety of factors, many of them innocuous. So, 
false positives are inherently part of signature-based intrusion detection schemes or any 
other type of anomaly detection system. 
Identifying good traffic as good traffic (true positive): An ideal result of 
intrusion detection mechanisms, identifying good traffic for what it is good traffic 
(OneSecure 2001). 
Noise: Data or interference that can trigger a false positive. 
Site policy: Guidelines within an organization that control the rules and 
configurations of an IDS. 
Site policy awareness: The ability an IDS has to dynamically change its rules 
and configurations in response to changing environmental activity. 
Confidence value: A value an organization places on an IDS based on past 
performance and analysis to help determine its ability to effectively identify an attack. 
Alarm filtering: The process of categorizing attack alerts produced from an IDS 
in order to distinguish false positives from actual attacks (Whitman, et al. 2009). 
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2.3. Types of IDSs 
 
There exist various IDS products in the market today. These products are 
categorized in several ways according to their different characteristics (Debar, et al. 
1999): 
Detection technique: Behavior based (misuse detection) and knowledge based 
(anomaly detection). 
Audit source location: Host log files (host based) and network packets 
(network based). 
Behavior on detection: Passive and active. 
 
2.3.1. Detection Technique 
 
Intrusion detection is a set of techniques that are used to detect suspicious 
activity both at the network and host level (Rafeeq 2003). The detection technique 
describes the characteristics of the analyzer (Debar, et al. 1999). When the IDS uses 
information about the normal behavior of the system it monitors and it is qualified as 
misuse detection. When the IDS uses information about the attacks, it is qualified as 
anomaly detection. 
Misuse detection IDS: Knowledge-based intrusion detection techniques apply 
the knowledge accumulated about specific attacks and system vulnerabilities. The IDS 
contains information about these vulnerabilities and looks for attempts to exploit them. 
When such an attempt is detected, an alarm is triggered (Debar, et al. 1999). In other 
words, any action that is not explicitly recognized as an attack is considered acceptable. 
Essentially, the IDS looks for a specific attack that has already been documented. Like a 
virus detection system, misuse detection software is only as good as the database of 
attack signatures that it uses to compare packet against. Therefore, the accuracy of 
misuse IDS is considered good. However, their completeness requires that their 
knowledge of attacks be updated regularly. 
Misuse detection provides various benefits. One of the benefits is that the 
signature definitions are modeled on known intrusive activity. Furthermore, the user can 
examine the signature database and quickly determine which intrusive activity the 
misuse detection system is programmed to alert on. Another benefit is that the misuse 
 9
detection system begins protecting the network immediately upon installation. One final 
benefit is that the system is easy to understand. When an alarm fires, the user can relate 
this directly to a specific type of activity occurring on the network. 
Along with the numerous benefits, misuse detection systems also have their 
share of drawbacks. One of the biggest problems is maintaining state information for 
signatures in which the intrusive activity encompasses multiple discrete events (that is, 
the complete attack signature occurs in multiple packets on the network) (Carter 2002). 
Another drawback is that the misuse detection system must have a signature defined for 
all of the possible attacks that an attacker may launch against the network. This leads to 
the necessity for frequent signature updates to keep the signature database of the misuse 
detection system up-to-date. One final problem with misuse detection systems is that 
someone may set up the misuse detection system in their lab and intentionally try to find 
ways to launch attacks that bypass detection by the misuse detection system. 
Anomaly detection IDS: Anomaly detection techniques assume that an 
intrusion can be detected by observing a deviation from normal or expected behavior of 
the system or the users (Debar, et al. 1999). The model of normal or valid behavior is 
extracted from reference information collected by various means. The security manager 
defines the baseline or normal state of the network’s traffic load, breakdown, protocol, 
and typical packet size. The IDS later compares this model with the current activity. If a 
deviation is observed, an alarm is generated. In other words, anything that does not 
correspond to a previously learned behavior is considered intrusive. Therefore, the IDS 
might be complete, but its accuracy is a difficult issue. The anomaly detection technique 
is as good as its normal model definition. 
Anomaly detection systems offer several benefits. First, they can detect insider 
attacks or account theft very easily. If a real user or someone using a stolen account 
starts performing actions that are outside the normal user profile, it generates an alarm. 
Second, because the system is based on customized profiles, it is very difficult for an 
attacker to know with certainty what activity he can do without setting off an alarm. 
Probably the largest benefit, however, is that intrusive activity is not based on a specific 
traffic that represents known intrusive activity as in a misuse IDS. An anomaly 
detection system can potentially detect an attack the first time it is used (Debar, et al. 
1999). The intrusive activity generates an alarm because it deviates from normal 
activity, not because someone configured the system to look for a specific stream of 
traffic. 
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Like every IDS, anomaly detection systems also suffer from several drawbacks. 
The first obvious drawback is that the system must be trained to create the appropriate 
user profiles. During the training period to define what normal traffic looks like on the 
network, the network is not protected from attack (Debar, et al. 1999). Maintenance of 
the profiles can also become time-consuming. Nevertheless, the biggest drawback to 
anomaly detection is probably the complexity of the system and the difficulty of 
associating an alarm with the specific event that triggered the alarm. Furthermore, there 
is no guarantee that a specific attack will be generate an alarm. If the intrusive activity is 
too close to normal user activity, then the attack will go unnoticed. It is also difficult to 
know which attacks will set off alarms unless actually test the attacks against the 
network using various user profiles (Carter 2002). 
 
2.3.2. Audit Source Location 
 
The audit source location distinguishes among IDSs based on the kind of input 
information they analyze. This input information can be audit trails, system logs or 
network packets. 
Host based IDS (HIDS): In a HIDS, activities on each individual computer or 
host are examined. Host audit sources are the only way to gather information about the 
activities of the users of a given machine. On the other hand, they are also vulnerable to 
alterations in the case of a successful attack. This creates an important real-time 
constraint on host-based IDSs, which have to process the audit trail and generate alarms 
before an attacker taking over the machine can subvert either the audit trail or the IDS 
itself. It is advisable to place HIDSs on all mission-critical systems, even those that 
should not, in theory, allow external access. 
The major benefit of a host based monitoring system verifies success or failure 
of an attack. Since a HIDS uses system logs containing events that have actually 
occurred, they can determine whether an attack occurred or not with greater accuracy 
and fewer false positives than a network based system. Second, a host based IDS sensor 
monitors user and file access activity including file accesses, changes to file 
permissions, attempts to install new executables etc. A host based IDS sensor can also 
monitor all user logon and logoff activity, user activities while connected to the 
network, file system changes, activities that are normally executed only by an 
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administrator. Operating systems log any event where user accounts are added, deleted 
or modified. The HIDS can detect an improper change as soon as it is executed. Third, 
host based systems can detect attacks that network based system sensors fail to detect. 
For example, if an unauthorized user makes changes to system files from the system 
console, this kind of attack goes unnoticed by the network sensors. Although HIDS does 
not offer true real-time response, it can come extremely close if implemented correctly. 
Many current host-based systems receive an interrupt from the operating system when 
there is a new log file entry. This new entry can be processed immediately, significantly 
reducing the time between recognition and response (SANS Institute 2001). There 
remains a delay between when the operating system records the event and the HIDS 
recognizes it, but in many intruders can be detected and stopped before damage is done. 
There are two major drawbacks to a host based IDS. The first difficulty is having 
incomplete network picture and necessity to support multiple operating systems. The 
other difficulty lies in the fact that a host based IDS needs to run on every system in the 
network. This requires verifying support for all of the different operating systems that 
used on the network. 
Network based IDS (NIDS): NIDS analyze the individual packets flowing 
through the network. NIDSs often consist of a set of single-purpose sensors placed at 
various points in a network. These units monitor network traffic, performing local 
analysis of that traffic and reporting attacks to a central management console. NIDSs 
analyze traffic moving across the network in much greater than a firewall. Therefore, 
NIDSs can detect malicious packets that are designed to be overlooked by a firewall’s 
simplistic filtering rules. NIDSs also watch for attacks that originate from within the 
network. That is why, they are complements for firewalls. 
A network based monitoring system has the benefit of seeing and coordinating 
attacks that are occurring across an entire network very easily. Seeing the attacks 
against the network gives a clear indication of the extent to which the network is being 
attacked. Furthermore, because the monitoring system is only examining traffic from 
the network, it does not have to support every type of operating system that used on the 
network. NIDSs use live network traffic for real-time attack detection. Therefore, an 
attacker cannot remove the evidence (SANS Institute 2001). Many hackers understand 
audit logs, they know how to manipulate these files to cover their tracks, frustrating host 
based systems that need this information to detect an intrusion. NIDSs add valuable data 
for determining malicious intent. A network based IDS placed outside of a firewall can 
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detect attacks intended for resources behind the firewall, even though the firewall may 
be rejecting these attempts. Host based systems do not see rejected attacks that never hit 
a host inside the firewall. This lost information can be critical in evaluating and refining 
security policies. 
One disadvantage of NIDS is that encryption of the network traffic stream can 
essentially blind the NIDS. Reconstructing fragmented traffic can also be a difficult 
problem to solve. Probably the biggest drawback to network based monitoring, 
however, is that as networks become increasingly larger (with respect to bandwidth),  it 
becomes more difficult to place a network based IDS at a single location on the network 
and capture all traffic successfully (Carter 2002). This then requires the utilization of 
more sensors throughout the network, which increases the costs of the IDS. 
As a final consequence of audit source location categorized IDSs, network based 
IDS is normally more effective than host based IDS due to the fact that a single system 
can monitor multiple systems and resources. 
 
2.3.3. Behavior on Detection 
 
Behavior on detection describes the response of the IDS to attacks. When it 
actively reacts to the attack by taking either corrective closing holes or proactive 
logging out possible attackers, closing down services actions, then the IDS is said to be 
active (Debar, et al. 1999). If the IDS merely generates alarms including paging, etc, it 
is said to be passive. 
Passive system: Many IDSs merely log the intrusion and the security 
administrator is notified by email or pager etc. This is known as passive response 
intrusion detection, as it does not actively attempts to stop the intrusion. Instead, a 
system administrator or someone else will have to respond to the alarm, take 
appropriate action to halt the attack, and possibly identify the intruder. Modern IDSs 
offer a wide range of options to send notifications of intrusions, including pager, cell 
phone, email, SNMP trap messages, or simply a message box on the administrator’s PC. 
It is important to make sure that the notifications are send in a secure manner to prevent 
the attacker from intercepting or altering them (Debar, et al. 1999). 
Active system: Active response IDSs automatically take action in response to a 
detected intrusion. The exact action differs per product and depends on the severity and 
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type of attack. A common active response is increasing the sensitivity level of the IDS 
to collect additional information about the attack and the attacker. Another possible 
active response is making changes to the configuration of systems or network devices 
such as routers and firewalls to stop the intrusion and block the attacker. This could 
involve blocking the source address of the attacker, restarting a server or service, 
closing connections or ports, and resetting TCP sessions (Debar, et al. 1999).  
 
2.4. Details of Detection Techniques 
 
As mentioned earlier, there are several types of IDSs which are classified into 
their detection techniques, audit source location, and behavior on detection. In 2.3.1 
Detection Technique, the IDSs categorized as misuse and anomaly detection system 
according to their using detection techniques. Rafeeq also commented the IDSs working 
principle that are used to detect suspicious activity at the network and host level by a set 
of detection techniques (Rafeeq 2003). At this point, the details of detection techniques 
are discussed below to have an idea about the working principle of IDSs. 
The ideal performance on an IDS is to identify as many attacks as possible and 
limit the number of false alarms (OneSecure 2001). Unfortunately, there is no single 
detection mechanism available today and an IDS can deploy to detect every type of 
attack. As a result, only a system that combines a variety of technologies to detect 
different types of attacks can get the job done. The most common way to implement a 
combination of detection techniques was to purchase two or more products and run 
them together. The two most commonly available network intrusion detection 
mechanisms on the market today are signature based and statistical protocol anomaly 
based detection (OneSecure 2001). Signature based systems look for known attack 
patterns (signatures) in traffic. Signature detection finds attacks for which a signature 
written, but it is unable to detect new attacks or many very complicated attacks. 
Protocol anomaly detection based systems, on the other hand, do a good job of detecting 
some of the unknown attacks, but are unable to identify attacks that operate without 
violating any protocols. All IDSs use the following detection techniques in the market: 
• Intrusion detection using signature, 
• Intrusion detection using protocol anomalies, 
• Intrusion detection using stateful signatures. 
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2.4.1. Intrusion Detection Using Signature 
 
The evaluation of NIDSs started with the implementation of a non-intrusive 
packet monitor, called a sniffer because of its ability to “sniff” the packets on the 
network. Intrusion detection vendors applied to the packet monitoring concept to build 
systems that performed packet signature detection (OneSecure 2001). Signature based 
detectors analyze system activity, looking for events or sets of events that match a 
predefined pattern of events that describe a known attack. They compare events and 
packets with signatures stored in their database and find out the matching ones. The 
most common form of signature based detection used in commercial products specifies 
each pattern of events corresponding to an attack as a separate signature (Bace and Mell 
2001). Signature detection finds attacks for which a signature is written and it is very 
effective at detecting attacks without generating an overwhelming number of false 
positives. 
However, there are many drawbacks to signature based approach to intrusion 
detection, especially if effort is placed entirely on building up a large repository of 
attack signatures, without regard to how the traffic is reassembled, decoded, normalized 
and analyzed. It is a problem when information is transmitted over the network; the 
information is split into numbered TCP segments that are sent as packets. In an ideal 
world, the packets would be transmitted in sequence and without loss. But, 
unfortunately, that is not the case. When a message is actually transmitted, the network 
will deliver the packets randomly (out of sequence) or as even smaller pieces of data 
(called fragments), which are broken down by networking devices, such as routers, to 
facilitate ease of transmission. Even worse, for whatever reason, packets can get “lost” 
or can be duplicated (OneSecure 2001). 
Another disadvantage of this mechanism is that it is unable to detect new 
attacks. Therefore, it must be constantly updated with signatures of new attacks. 
However, signature updates may sometimes result in inability of detecting previously 
detected attacks. Lastly, signature based detectors cannot detect many very complicated 
attacks. 
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2.4.2. Intrusion Detection Using Protocol Anomalies 
 
Protocol anomaly detection, which is sometimes called protocol analysis, is the 
ability to analyze packet flows (the uni-directional communication between two 
systems) to identify irregularities in the generally accepted Internet rules of 
communication (OneSecure 2001). Those rules are defined by open protocols and 
published standards (RFC-Request for Comment), as well as vendor defined 
specifications for communication between networked devices. 
Protocol anomaly detection attempts to save time by first identifying the 
protocol and looking specifically for anomalous activity or attack patterns relevant to 
that protocol. By doing so, it can do a much more targeted and thus more effective 
search (TopLayerNetworks 2002). In other words, protocol anomaly detection identifies 
traffic that does not meet specifications or violets the relevant standards. Once an 
irregularity is identified, it can be used to make network security decisions. This is very 
effective in detecting suspicious activity such as a buffer overflow attack. 
The advantages of protocol anomaly detection are that it can detect (OneSecure 
2001): 
• Unknown and new attacks, based on the fact that these attacks deviate 
from protocol standards, 
• Attacks that bypass systems that implement other detection techniques, 
• Slightly modified attacks that change the format of known attack 
patterns, with no effect on the strength of the attack to evade signature 
based systems 
An example of detecting the FTP bounce attack using protocol anomaly is 
described below (OneSecure 2001): 
The FTP bounce attack exploits a design flaw in the specifications of FTP. To 
download or upload files, a user must first connect to an FTP server. When this 
happens, the server requires the client to send the IP address and port number to which 
the file should be sent to or taken from. This is done via a mechanism called a “Port 
Command”. However, the port command specification does not limit the IP address to 
the user’s address. Because of this, an attacker can tell the FTP server to open a 
connection to an IP address that is different from the user’s address and then use the 
open port to transfer files containing a Trojan through the FTP server onto the victim. 
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Since protocol anomaly detection is designed to look network relationships and 
determine whether both sides are acting within the normal specifications, IDS can parse 
the requests in a port command whenever seen and compare it to the IP address from 
which the port command arrived. If they do not match, the IDS needs to send an alarm. 
Protocol anomaly based systems do a good job of detecting some of the 
unknown attacks like the one described. But their main drawback is that they are unable 
to identify attacks that operate without violating any protocols, such as Trojan or Worm. 
These attacks install and open up a backdoor on a network resource. This backdoor lays 
inactive until the attacker activates it and takes control over the resource. Besides that, 
protocol anomaly detection systems usually produce a large number of false alarms due 
to the unpredictable behaviors of users and networks. 
    
2.4.3. Intrusion Detection Using Stateful Signatures 
  
Another alternative approach that overcomes the accuracy deficiencies of packet 
signature detection is stateful signature detection. This advanced detection mechanism 
identifies attack patterns by utilizing both stateful inspection and protocol analysis, 
which is performed as part of protocol anomaly detection (OneSecure 2001). As a 
result, stateful signature detection systems understand the context of each data byte and 
the state of the client and server at the time of transmission. This means that stateful 
signatures can be compared to only relevant data bytes, according to the communication 
state to which each signature is relevant. 
Stateful signatures detection mechanism looks at the context and the placement 
of signature to make smarter decisions about whether it represents an attack. The IDS 
keeps track of the state of the connection with the outside entity, and considers the 
broader context of all the transactions initiated during the connection 
(TopLayerNetworks 2002). In other words, stateful signatures only look for an attack in 
the state of the communication where that attack can cause damage, thus significantly 
improving performance and reducing false positives. 
The drawback of this system is the same as the signature based detectors; it 
catches only known attacks and only if the signature database is constantly updated. 
Unfortunately, the people out there trying to exploit networks are neither lazy nor 
stupid; they constantly unleash new variations and new attacks. With each new attack, 
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new signatures have to be taught to the IDS. Over time, this led to a need for IDS 
products to hold literally thousands of attack signatures and constantly scan for them all 
(TopLayerNetworks 2002). In addition, while the signature database being constantly 
updated, attackers know exactly how the IDS products work, so they continuously make 
slight alterations to elude detection. Thus, a more intelligent signature mechanism is 
needed to bring about more accurate results. 
 
2.5. Response Options for IDSs 
 
Today, IDS products support a wide range of response options, often categorized 
as active responses, passive responses, or some mixture of both.     
 
2.5.1. Active Responses 
 
Active IDS responses are automated actions taken when certain types of 
intrusions are detected. There are three categories of active responses: 
Collect additional information: The most innocuous, but at times most 
productive, active response is to collect additional information about a suspected attack. 
This might involve increasing the level of sensitivity of information sources (for 
instance turning up the number of events logged by an operating system audit trail, or 
increasing the sensitivity of a network monitor to capture all packets, not just those 
targeting a particular port or target system). Collecting additional information is helpful 
for several reasons. The additional information collected can help resolve the detection 
of the attack. This option help also allows the organization to gather information that 
can be used to support investigation and apprehension of the attacker and to support 
criminal and civil legal remedies (Bace and Mell 2001). 
Change the environment: Another active response is to halt an attack in 
progress and then block subsequent access by the attacker. Typically, IDSs do not have 
the ability to block a specific person’s access, but instead block IP addresses from 
which the attacker appears to be coming. It is very difficult to block a determined and 
knowledgeable attacker, but IDSs can often deter expert attackers or stop novice 
attackers by taking the following actions (Bace and Mell 2001): 
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• Injecting TCP reset packets into the attacker’s connection to the victim 
system, thereby terminating the connection, 
• Reconfiguring routers and firewalls to block packets from the attacker’s 
apparent location (IP Address or site), 
• Reconfiguring routers and firewalls to block the network ports, protocols, 
or services being used by an attacker, and 
• In extreme situations, reconfiguring routers and firewalls to break all 
connections that use certain network interfaces. 
Take action against the intruder: The most aggressive form of this response 
involves launching attacks against or attempting to actively gain information about the 
attacker’s host or site. The primary reason for approaching this option with a great deal 
of caution is that it may be illegal. Furthermore, since many attackers use false network 
addresses when attacking systems, this action has a risk of causing damage to innocent 
Internet sites and users. Finally, strike back can escalate the attack, provoking an 
attacker who originally intended only to browse a site to take more aggressive action 
(Bace and Mell 2001). 
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2.5.2. Passive Responses 
 
Passive IDS responses provide information to system users, relying on them to 
take necessary action based on that information. Many IDS products rely solely on 
passive responses. 
Alarms and notifications: Alarms and notifications are generated by IDSs to 
inform users when attacks are detected. The most common form of alarm is an onscreen 
alert or popup window. This is displayed on the IDS console or on other systems as 
specified by the user during the configuration of the IDS. The information provided in 
the alarm message varies widely, ranging from a notification that an intrusion has taken 
place to extremely detailed messages outlining the IP addresses of the source and target 
of the attack, the specific attack tool used to gain access, and the outcome of the attack 
(Bace and Mell 2001). Another set of options is to configure the IDSs so that they send 
alert messages to cellular phones and pagers carried by incident response teams or 
security managers. 
SNMP traps and plug-ins: Some commercial IDSs use SNMP traps and 
messages to send alarms to central network management consoles. This provides the 
ability to adapt the entire network infrastructure to respond to a detected attack, the 
ability to shift the processing load, associated with an active response, to a system other 
than the one being targeted by the attack, and the ability to use communication channels 
(Bace and Mell 2001). 
 
2.6. Snort 
 
Snort is a free network packet analysis tool written by Martin Roesch in 1998 for 
his personal use. Snort is now one of the most widely used security tools in the open-
source world. Snort is perfect for detecting DoS, fragmentation, known buffer 
overflows, scanning worms and scripts, cross-site, and injection attacks. Snort can be 
connected to external databases to ease packet and event logging and analysis, link it to 
reporting tools, manage it through centralized consoles, and enable it to participate in 
many types of alert systems. 
Snort’s packet capturing routine allows to capture all packets headed to and from 
a honey pot. In order for Snort to detect malicious packets reliably, it needs to inspect 
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all packets. Captured packets are passed to the packet-decode engine component. The 
packet-decode engine separates packets into their higher and lower layer components. 
This is because different attacks occur at different levels, and Snort does not need to 
apply all its rules to all layers for all attacks. For example, if a buffer overflow will 
never occur at the frame layer, there is no need to examine that layer for buffer overflow 
attacks. 
Snort works by using the libcap capture API (as does WinPcap, tcpdump, and 
Ethereal) to capture packets for examination and logging. A packet-decode engine 
examines the packets, hands them to preprocessor plug-ins, and then on the signature-
detection engine, which produces actions (allow, deny, and log) and outputs (alert, log, 
and so on). See Figure 2.1. for an illustration of the Snort packet pathway (Grimes 
2005). 
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Figure 2.1. Snort packet pathway. 
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2.6.1. Snort Modes 
 
Snort is often described as a virus scanner for network packets, but it has three 
modes: packet dump, packet logger, and network IDS. Packet dump mode captures 
packets and displays them to the screen (the console). Packet logger mode writes 
packets to a physical file. Snort can be used in both modes at the same time, mimicking 
a command-line network protocol analyzer. In network IDS mode, Snort will analyze 
grabbed packets for malicious content. All three modes can be used together in different 
combinations (Grimes 2005). 
Snort is not an install and execute program. It takes a fairly good understanding 
of what it does and how it operates to configure and use properly. Besides making sure 
that the Snort host computer is hardened against detection and attack, honey pot 
administrators should use the following steps when configuring it for the first time: 
1. Decide what Snort to do. 
2. Configure the Snort configuration file. 
3. Configure rule sets. 
4. Test the Snort configuration. 
5. Create and use a Snort.bat file. 
The first decision is which mode to put Snort in. Snort can be configured to be a 
packet sniffer or network IDS. 
Snort packet dump mode: To enable Snort to sniff packets to the console, 
Snort.exe can be executed with one or more of three command-line switches: 
• -v: This puts Snort in packet dump (sniffer) mode. With just the –v 
option enabled, only the network and transport layer header information 
will be captured and displayed. 
• -e: If the –e parameter enabled, the layer 2 frame headers added to the 
information collected. To most people, this means that getting ARP 
information. This information can be useful to ensure Snort is correctly 
emulating the MAC addresses in response to queries to its virtual IP 
addresses. 
• -d: The –d parameter will display all payload data information from the 
transport layer. 
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 In packet dump mode with all three parameters set, the following fields (in 
order) are captured on TCP packets (Grimes 2005): 
• Date 
• Time 
• Source MAC address 
• Destination MAC address 
• IP protocol ID number (transport protocol type) 
• Total packet length (in hex) 
• Source IP address 
• Source port number 
• Destination IP address 
• Destination port number 
• Transport protocol name 
• TTL setting 
• Type-of-service setting 
• IP packet ID 
• IP header length 
• Packet length 
• TCP flags (represented by their first letter of their name: S for SYN, P for 
PSH, A for ACK, and so on) 
• Sequence number 
• Acknowledgement number 
• Window size 
• Transport protocol header size 
• Payload data 
Snort network IDS mode: Although Snort can be used purely as a packet 
sniffer, it is not primary reason to have it as a part of the network security system. 
Snort’s specialty is detecting malicious content in sniffed packets. To put Snort into its 
network IDS mode, the -c command-line parameter is needed to use to point to the 
Snort configuration file. 
The configuration file contains commands to define the following items during 
Snort’s runtime: 
• System variables 
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• Which preprocessor plug-ins to load 
• Which rule sets to load 
• Which output plug-ins to use 
Snort comes with a default configuration file called Snort.conf, in the etc 
directory. The different sections are well differentiated in the configuration file. When 
Snort is executed with the configuration file, Snort will run with those options during its 
execution (Grimes 2005). 
 
2.6.2. Components of Snort 
 
Snort is logically divided into multiple components. These components work 
together to detect attacks and to generate output in a required format from the detection 
system. Snort consists of the following major components (Rafeeq 2003): 
• Packet Decoder 
• Preprocessors 
• Detection Engine 
• Logging and Alerting System 
• Output Modules 
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Packet decoder: The packet decoder takes packets from different types of 
network interfaces and prepares the packets to be preprocessed or to be sent to the 
detection engine. The interfaces may be Ethernet, SLIP, PPP, WiFi and so on. It parses 
the packet and decodes the string of bytes into a packet structure that is formed of 
protocol fields and flags. Each subroutine in the decoder imposes order on the packet 
data by overlaying data structures on the raw network traffic. These decoding routines 
are called in order through the protocol stack, from the data link layer up through the 
transport layer, finally ending at the application layer. During this decoding process, it 
validates the length and checksum fields. It then forwards the valid packets to the 
preprocessors (Rafeeq 2003). 
Preprocessors: According to the Snort configuration that introduced by Snort 
Users Manual when a packet is received by Snort, it may not be ready for processing by 
the main Snort detection engine and application of Snort rules. For example, a packet 
may be fragmented. Before searching a string within the packet or determine its exact 
size, defragmentation is required by assembling all fragments of the data packet. On 
IDS, before applying any rules or try to find a signature, the packets have to be 
reassembled (Rafeeq 2003). The job of a preprocessor is to make a packet suitable for 
the detection engine to apply different rules to it. In addition, some preprocessors are 
used for other tasks such as detection of anomalies and obvious errors in data packets, 
decoding of HTTP URI. All enabled preprocessors operate on each packet. There is no 
way to bypass some of the preprocessors based upon some criteria. 
Detection engine: The detection engine is the most important part of Snort. Its 
responsibility is to detect if any intrusion activity exists in a packet. The detection 
engine employs Snort rules for this purpose (Snort 2009). The rules are read into 
internal data structures or chains where they are matched against all packets. Snort 
organizes parts of packets to make the job of matching rules against them faster. It 
maintains detection rules in a two dimensional linked list of what are termed Chain 
Headers and Chain Options. The commonalities are condensed into a single Chain 
Headers and individual detection signatures are kept in Chain Option structures. If a 
packet matches any rule, appropriate action is taken; otherwise the packet is dropped. 
Appropriate actions may be logging the packet or generating alerts. 
Logging and alerting system: This system is responsible from the generation of 
alerts and logging of packets and messages. Depending upon what the detection engine 
finds inside a packet, the packet may be used to log the activity or generate an alert. All 
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of the log files are stored under a preconfigured location by default. This location can be 
configured using command line options. There are many command line options to 
modify the type and detail of information that is logged by the logging and alerting 
system (Snort 2009). 
Output modules: Basically, these modules control the type of output generated 
by the logging and alerting system. Depending on the configuration, output modules can 
send output messages to a number of other destinations. Commonly used output 
modules are (Snort 2009): 
• The database module is used to store Snort output data in databases, such 
as MySQL, MSSQL or Oracle, 
• The SNMP module can be used to send Snort alert in the form of traps to 
a management server, 
• The Sending Server Message Block (SMB) alerts module can send alerts 
to Microsoft Windows machines in the form of pop-up SMB alert 
windows, 
• The syslog module logs messages to the syslog utility (using this module 
logs messages to a centralized logging server), 
• XML or CSV modules can be used to save data in XML or comma 
separated files. The CSV files can then be imported into databases or 
spreadsheet software for future processing or analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
COMPLEX EVENT PROCESSING 
 
Complex event processing (CEP) is primarily an event processing concept that 
deals with the task of processing multiple events with the goal of identifying the 
meaningful events within the event cloud. CEP employs techniques such as detection of 
complex patterns of many events, event correlation and abstraction, event hierarchies, 
and relationships between events such as causality, membership, and timing, and event 
driven processes. CEP is to discover information contained in the events happening 
across all the layers in an organization and then analyze its impact from the macro level 
as “complex event” and then take subsequent action plan in real time (Wikipedia 2009). 
Examples of events include a car, some sensors and various events and 
reactions. In the situation, the car is moving and the pressure of one of the tires from 45 
PSI to 41 PSI in 5 seconds. As the pressure in the tire is reducing, a serious of events 
containing the tire pressure is generated. In addition, a series of events containing the 
speed of the car is generated. The car’s event processor may detect a situation whereby 
a loss of tire pressure over relatively long period of time results in the creation of the 
“lossOfTirePressure” event. 
There are many commercial applications of CEP including stock trading, credit 
card fraud detection, business activity monitoring, and security monitoring. New 
applications of CEP are emerging as technology vendors find new uses. 
Most CEP solutions and concepts can be classified into two main categories. The 
first one which is a computation oriented CEP solution is focused on executing on-line 
algorithms as a response to event data entering the system is to continuously calculate 
an average based in data on the inbound events. The other one is detection oriented CEP 
is focused on detecting combinations of events called event patterns or situations 
(Wikipedia 2009). 
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3.1. Event Driven Systems 
 
An event driven system (Berson 1992) is a system of objects which interact with 
each other using a message-passing mechanism. This mechanism is controlled by 
distinct component that is usually called the event dispatcher, and act as an intermediary 
between objects. The data communicated are called events and they can originate from 
input devices in an unprocessed form (raw event) or they can be a result of 
communication between objects. The objects receive events in the form of event 
messages, typically of a fixed length and made up of an event type identifier and the 
event parameters. Each object has a designated programming procedure called event 
procedure that invokes individual procedures called event handlers for each type of 
event message.  
To illustrate how an event driven system works, suppose in a GUI the user clicks 
the left mouse button in the client area of the window a drawing application. This 
generates a raw event that contains the mouse position and which mouse buttons were 
pressed at that moment. The event dispatcher receives the raw event and adds 
information such as the application it is destined for, creates an event message and 
places it in a queue for the recipient application to pick it up. The recipient application 
checks for new messages and finds it. Subsequently, the event procedure is executed 
and chooses the suitable event handler for the specific mouse event message. 
Event driven systems have typically been built around either relational databases 
or real-time messaging systems, or a combination of both. While these technologies 
have their advantages, neither is particularly well suited for managing and analyzing 
events in rapidly changing environments (Coral8 2009): 
• Relations database servers can process large amounts of stored data and 
can analyze the information with relative ease but are not designed to 
operate in real-time environments, and do not provide an effective way 
to monitor rapidly changing data. 
• Messaging systems permit data to be monitored in real time but are not 
generally capable of complex computations, correlations, pattern 
matching or references to historical data. 
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For these reasons, custom application must often be combined with these 
technologies to create a viable solution. The use of custom applications to compensate 
for the limitations of these technologies creates new complications: 
• Custom applications become increasingly complex very quickly as an 
organization’s need for progressively more sophisticated analysis grows. 
• Custom applications are also costly to modify, and they do not scale well 
as organizational needs change. 
 
3.2. Real-Time Computing 
 
Real-time computing is the study of hardware and software systems that are 
subject to a real-time constraint such as operational deadlines from event to system 
response. By contrast, a non-real-time system is one for which there is no deadline, even 
if fast response or high performance is desired or preferred. The needs of real-time 
software are often addressed in the context of real-time operating systems, and 
synchronous programming languages, which provide frameworks on which to build 
real-time application software. 
A real-time system may be one where its application can be considered (within 
context) to be mission critical. The anti-lock brakes on a car are a simple example of a 
real-time computing system; the constraint in this system is the short time in which the 
brakes must be released to prevent the wheel from locking. Real-time computations can 
be said to have failed if they are not completed before their deadline, where their 
deadline is relative to an event. A real-time deadline must be met, regardless of system 
load (Wikipedia 2009). 
Real-time computing is sometimes misunderstood to be high-performance 
computing, but this is not always the case. For example, a massive supercomputer 
executing a scientific simulation may offer impressive performance, yet it is not 
executing a real-time computing. Furthermore, if a network server is highly loaded with 
network traffic, its response time may be slower but will still succeed. Hence, such a 
network server would not be considered a real-time system. In a real-time system such 
as the FTSE 100 Index, a slow-down beyond limits would often be considered 
catastrophic in its application context. Therefore, the most important requirement of a 
real-time system is predictability and not performance. 
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3.3. Coral8 Engine 
 
Coral8 engine is an information processing system designed to run continuous 
queries. This means that instead of having to submit a query each time to produce 
results, submit the query to Coral8 server, which runs the query continuously until set it 
to stop. This gives a power to examine and analyze large volumes of incoming data 
virtually instantaneously, even if the data is arriving at very high speeds, without having 
to store the information in a database first. 
Today, businesses are operating in environments where the need to monitor 
events comes at an ever-accelerating pace. These businesses require systems that can 
process large quantities of fast moving data, monitor events as they occur, detect 
patterns, and generate needed results immediately. Coral8 engine is a leader in a new 
generation of tools for processing, analyzing, and managing events in these highly 
dynamic environments.  
Coral8 engine is a powerful new tool in the field of Complex Event Processing 
(CEP) applications. Coral8 engine can be used to build applications for processing and 
analyzing large volumes of fast-moving data in highly dynamic environments. Like a 
real-time messaging system, Coral8 reacts to each new peace of data immediately. Like 
a relational database system, Coral8 supports the use of a query language similar to 
SQL to process and analyze incoming data, and to correlate it with historical data. 
Coral8 also provides sophisticated-matching capabilities without requiring large 
amounts of custom application code (Coral8 2009).   
 
Coral8 engine includes the following distinguishing features (Coral8 2009): 
• A relational model for accessing real-time data streams, 
• Queries run continuously, not just when a query submitted, 
• A rich language, based on SQL, but adapted for processing real-time 
event data, and extended to deal with the temporal characteristics of 
messages, 
• The ability to analyze data and event patterns across a wide variety of 
data sources to locate pertinent information, 
• Extensive capabilities for integrating data from external relational 
databases, 
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• Adapters that can be used to integrate Coral8 engine with a variety of 
external systems 
• SDKs for a variety of languages (Java, C, C++, Perl, Python, .NET, etc.) 
that permit customized interfaces and adapters to be easily implemented, 
• A modern development environment for developing, monitoring and 
managing queries, 
• Optimized performance that can accommodate hundreds of thousands of 
messages per second per server, with a processing latency measured in 
milliseconds, 
• Guaranteed delivery, high availability, security, and other important 
enterprise requirements. 
The Coral8 engine consists of the following major components (Morrel and 
Vidich 2008): 
• Continuous Computing Language (CCL): CCL is an SQL-like 
language used for writing continuous queries, which manipulate Coral8 
data. CCL is converted into an executable form by the CCL compiler. 
• Coral8 Server: Coral8 server processes streams of incoming data against 
registered continuous queries written in CCL. 
• Coral8 Data Model: The Coral8 data model consists of streams and 
windows providing a foundation on which CCL queries can process data. 
• Input and Output Adapters: Adapters translate data from a wide 
variety of external sources into a format compatible with Coral8‘s data 
model, and also translate Coral8 data back into formats that can be sent 
to external destinations. 
• Coral8 Studio: Coral8 studio is a GUI, which lets users easily edit CCL 
queries, view streams and windows, control and monitor Coral8 servers, 
and debug Coral8 applications in an interactive development 
environment.   
Figure 3.1 shows Coral8 architecture and its major components below: 
 
 32
  
Figure 3.1. Coral8 architecture  
(Source: Coral8 2009). 
 
3.4. Using Continuous Computing Language 
 
Data streams are the fundamental way in which data is transmitted throughout 
Coral8. CCL queries take data from data streams, process that data and send it into other 
streams. While data streams which are similar to database tables do not retain any state. 
Therefore, only the most recent row in a data stream is visible to data stream queries. 
Time is an essential aspect of Coral8. Data rows arrive continuously and the 
CCL queries associated with a data stream execute every time a new row arrives. Every 
row in Coral8 has an associated row timestamp.  
External data enters Coral8 engine through input adapters, which translates data 
from an external format into a format usable by Coral8 engine. A CCL query places its 
results in a data stream, which may be connected to an output adapter. The output 
adapter translates the data into the required external format and sends it to the external 
destination. 
 A row in a data stream can be processed by a CCL query only when it arrives in 
the Coral8 engine. However, CCL windows are used to maintain the state of previously 
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arrived rows. The window definition states the policy that determines what rows in a 
stream should be retained and for how long. Count-based and time-based windows 
retain rows for a specified maximum number and a specified interval of time 
respectively. Both count-based and time-based windows may be sliding or jumping. 
All data streams and windows must have schemas that specify their structure. A 
schema specifies the number and names of the columns in the stream or window and 
indicates each column’s datatype. The following datatypes are available in Coral8: 
Boolean, Integer, Long, Float, String, Timestamp, Interval, XML, Blob and so on. 
Data streams and their schemas, adapters, windows, and query modules have 
discussed above. All of the basic steps listed below must be taken before a CCL query 
can be successfully executed (Coral8 2009): 
1. Create or open a query module, 
2. Add uniquely named data streams to the module, 
3. Create a schema, or assign an existing schema, for each stream, 
4. Add adapters to streams that either subscribe or publish to external 
sources, 
5. Write CCL queries and run the query module. 
A basic understanding of Coral8 components and working with CCL queries 
shown in Figure 3.2 (Coral8 2009): 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Using CCL in Coral8  
(Source: Coral8 2009). 
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3.5. Continuous Computing Language Queries 
 
The Coral8 CCL is a language based on the ANSI SQL Standard. It is used to 
manipulate, analyze and process data within the Coral8 engine. Like SQL, CCL syntax 
is structured around commands called statements. One or more CCL statements reside 
in a query module. When a query module is started, all the CCL statements in it are 
executed and run continuously until the module is stopped or the Coral8 engine is shut 
down. 
SQL is designed to query data from static tables; CCL is adapted to the needs of 
processing and analyzing dynamic data. A CCL query statement takes data from one or 
more data sources, processes it and then publishes it to a destination. This is the most 
common statement in CCL and can take many complex forms (Coral8 2009). 
 
Figure 3.3 is an example of the simplest possible query statement: 
 
Figure 3.3. The simplest CCL query statement. 
 
The INSERT INTO clause, which is always the first clause in a query statement, 
indicates the destination of the query output. This query publishes its output to the 
StockTradesAll  stream. The SELECT clause defines the contents of the query output. 
This query uses the “*” syntax which indicates that all columns should be selected from 
the source data stream. Columns and rows of the source can be selected by using one or 
more filter or selection conditions. The FROM clause follows the SELECT clause and 
specifies one or more data sources to which the query subscribes. The semicolon “;” is 
used to terminate every CCL query statement. 
In figure 3.4, CCL expressions are combinations of literals, column names, 
operators, and functions that evaluate to a single value and Figure 3.5 includes the input 
and output of execution of the CCL query:  
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 Figure 3.4. A CCL expression query example  
(Source: Coral8 2009). 
 
Figure 3.5. The input and output of the CCL expression query  
(Source: Coral8 2009). 
 
In figure 3.6 and 3.7, CCL windows permit to maintain the state of rows that 
have been previously processed from a stream. CCL windows are typically defined by 
the use of a KEEP clause. Count-based windows have a KEEP clause that defines the 
maximum number of rows, the window will keep, and whether or not these rows will 
expire from the window one at a time (a sliding count-based window), or all in a group 
(a jumping count-based window): 
 36
  
Figure 3.6. The input and output of the sliding count-based window example  
(Source: Coral8 2009). 
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Figure 3.7. The input and output of the jumping count-based window example  
(Source: Coral8 2009). 
 
All of the queries seen so far have involved a single data source. However, a 
query may use data from multiple data sources. Using multiple data sources in a single 
query is handled by an operator called a join. 
Figure3.8 is an example of a simple join query that publishes the most recent 
trade for a stock whenever an inquiry is made for that stock symbol: 
 
 Figure 3.8. The simple join query example. 
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Multiple data sources in a join (correlation) are separated by commas in the 
FROM clause. Only one of the sources can be a stream, other sources must be windows. 
Figure 3.9 shows the simple join multiple data sources query example below: 
 Figure 3.9. The input and output of the simple join query example  
(Source: Coral8 2009). 
 
The event pattern matching clause MATCHING uses operators “,” (followed 
by), “&&” (and), “||” (or), and “!” (not) to express highly complex event patterns that 
would otherwise require multiple joins to detect. Figure 3.10 shows the simple event 
pattern matching query example below: 
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 Figure 3.10. The simple event pattern matching query example. 
 
3.6. Building Custom Complex Event Processing Applications 
 
Custom applications start simple, as the initial requirements are typically very 
limited. Many begin with simple filtering or aggregation. Problems increase quickly, 
however, as windows, complex aggregations, correlation, pattern matching, and levels 
of complexity are added. Despite the promise of a “custom solution”, performance 
rapidly becomes a problem. Providing enterprise features such as scalability, clustering 
and high-availability while developing, extending and maintaining custom CEP 
applications is notoriously difficult and time-consuming. Some custom applications are 
written on top of a messaging system, or a message bus. Unfortunately, message buses 
solve mainly transport-level problems, such as asynchronous message delivery, 
publish/subscribe multicast and guaranteed delivery. Other than performing basic 
filtering, message buses offer no support for any complex computation, correlation or 
pattern matching. All of these tasks must still be implemented in a custom application 
(Coral8 2009). 
Coral8 provides a new infrastructure for the world of custom CEP applications. 
This infrastructure combines the following elements (Coral8 2009): 
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New programming model for streaming data: 
• A relational model for real-time streaming data, 
• An execution model for running queries continuously, not only when a 
query submitted, 
• A rich language based on SQL, but suitable for real-time processing, that 
incorporates extensions to deal with the time dimension, events, event 
patterns, and so on. 
 
High-performance, scalable, reliable processing platform: 
• Performance equaling the very best custom applications (tens of 
thousands messages per seconds per server, with processing latency 
measured in milliseconds), 
• A clustered and federated model for processing streaming data, 
• Guaranteed delivery, failover, high availability and other critical 
enterprise requirements.  
 
Integration Framework: 
• A sophisticated adapter model that supports integration with all kinds of 
external systems for event input and output, 
• Rich capabilities for interacting with external databases and applications, 
supporting the ability to correlate real-time and historical, or reference 
data, 
• The ability to extend the system by building and registering custom 
functions, aggregators, adapters, and so on. 
Tools: 
• Coral8 studio which lets developers create, debug and monitor their CEP 
applications, 
• A portal framework for building business user applications that let 
business users choose query parameters, presentation options, and 
notification options, 
• Numerous command-line tools and SDKs that support C/C++, Java, .Net, 
Perl, Python, and other environments. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTRUSION DETECTION ALERT CORRELATION 
 
Intrusion detection has been an active research field for more than 25 years since 
Anderson published his seminal work on (Anderson 1980). After Anderson’s report, 
many IDSs have been designed, implemented and deployed into networks. They are a 
line of defense to protect digital assets. Although many novel designs and 
improvements have been proposed, at present, IDSs still suffer from a few drawbacks 
(Xu and Ning 2006): 
• IDSs may flag thousands of alerts every day, thus overwhelming security 
officers. For instance, the  experience of the authors shows that 325.968 
alerts were reported when a Snort box was deployed for 6 days in a subnet 
hosting of a teaching lab on a campus network, 
• Among all the alerts reported by IDSs, false positives are mixed with true 
alerts. In addition, it is very possible that a large percentage of alerts are false 
positives. For example, Julish and other researchers (Julish and Dacier 2002) 
pointed out that up to 99% of alerts could be false positives. This may make 
the alert investigation very challenging, 
• At present, IDSs cannot guarantee the detection of all attacks. In other 
words, they may miss some attacks, which could be critical for security 
officers to understand the current security threats. 
These limitations of IDSs make security investigation not only time-consuming, 
but also error-prone. It is very challenging for security officers to fully learn the security 
threats in their networks as well as over the Internet. To address these challenges, 
various alert correlation techniques have been proposed in recent years. 
Alert correlation is a process that takes as input the alerts produced by one or 
more intrusion detection sensors and provides a more succinct and high-level view of 
occurring or attempted intrusions. The main objective is to produce intrusion reports 
that capture a high-level view of the activity on the network without losing security-
relevant information (Kruegel, et al. 2005). 
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The notion of security-relevant information cannot be completely objective since 
it depends on a site’s security policy. A security policy defines the desired properties for 
each part of a secure site’s installation. It is a decision that has to take into account the 
value of the assets that should be protected, the expected threats and the cost of proper 
protection mechanisms. A sufficient security policy for the data of a normal user at 
home may not be sufficient for bank applications, as these systems are obviously a more 
likely target and have to protect more valuable resources. Therefore, it is important to 
accommodate different requirements of different security policies for a correlation 
scheme to be adjusted. 
The alert correlation process consists of a collection of components that 
transform sensor alerts into intrusion reports. Since alerts can refer to different kinds of 
attacks at different levels of granularity, the correlation process cannot equally treat all 
alerts. Instead, it is necessary to provide a set of components that focus on different 
aspects of the overall correlation task (Kruegel, et al. 2005). 
Some of the components can operate independently on all alerts, according to 
their type. These components are used in the initial and final phase of the correlation 
process to implement general functionality that is applicable to all alerts. Other 
components can only work with certain classes of alerts. These components are 
responsible for performing specific correlation tasks that cannot be generalized for 
arbitrary alerts. 
Figure 4.1 gives a graphical representation of the alert correlation process 
(Kruegel, et al. 2005). The core of this process consists of some components 
implementing the specific functions, which operate on different spatial and temporal 
properties. For instance, some of the components correlate events occurring at the 
closing time and space (e.g., alerts generated on one host within a small time window), 
while others operate on events. These events represent an attack scenario evolving over 
several hours and including alerts generated on different hosts (e.g., alerts that represent 
large-scale scanning activity). 
In the process shown in Figure 4.1, alerts correlated by one component are used 
as input by the next component. However, it is not necessary for all alerts passing 
through the same components sequentially. Some components can operate in parallel, 
and it is even possible that the output of the alerts occurred as a sequence of 
components can fed back as an input to a previous component of the process. That is, 
even though the process is represented as a pipeline for the sake of presentation, some 
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components of the process may be applied multiple times, may be applied in parallel, or 
may be applied in a different order. 
 
Figure 4.1. Correlation process overview  
(Source: Kruegel, et al. 2005). 
 
4.1. Alert Correlation Techniques 
 
The alert correlation process should be carried out by implementing alert 
correlation techniques. These alert correlation techniques can be classified into three 
categories (Zhai, et al. 2006): similarity-based correlation, correlation by matching with 
pre-defined attack scenarios, and correlation based on the prerequisite and consequence 
of individual attacks. Xu and Ning also add a correlation technique which based on 
multiple information sources (Xu and Ning 2006). This provides frameworks to model 
different types of information and may further perform reasoning based on IDS alerts 
and other information. Each technique has its advantages and disadvantages. However, 
the correctness of correlation results is strongly affected by the false positives and false 
negatives among IDS alerts. 
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4.1.1. Similarity-based Correlation 
 
IDSs may flag alerts when suspicious events are observed. Each alert usually has 
several attributes associated with it. For example, NIDSs report the suspicious event’s 
source IP address, source port number, destination IP address, destination port number, 
and timestamps information. Based on these attribute values, some similarity based alert 
correlation approaches first compute how similar two or more alerts are, and then group 
alerts together based on these computed similarity values. Approaches in this category 
can potentially reduce the number of alerts reported to the security officers, because a 
group of similar alerts may correspond to the same attack or attack trend (Xu and Ning 
2006). 
To understand this idea, assume that there are two network based IDSs: Snort 
and RealSecure network sensor. Furthermore, there is an FTP attack in the network, and 
this attack is detected by both Snort and RealSecure network sensors. For the alerts 
reported by Snort and RealSecure, it is very likely that they have the same attribute 
values (IP Addresses, port numbers, timestamps, etc.). Through identifying these similar 
attribute values, security officers may realize that these alerts correspond to the same 
attack. 
At this point, how to define similarity measures usually is one of the major 
focuses. There are several different similarity measures being purposed. 
A probabilistic approach to performing alert correlation specifies expectation of 
similarity and minimum similarity for common features of alerts. Each alert reported by 
heterogeneous IDSs’ sensors is assumed to have several features, for example, target 
hosts and ports, and timestamps. The main purpose of this approach is to compute the 
similarity values among the alerts (Valdes and Skinner 2001). For each feature of the 
alerts, a similarity function is defined, which will be used to calculate the similarity 
value for the same feature among different alerts. Notice that feature similarity 
functions may be defined through various criteria. For example, the similarity between 
IP addresses may consider if they are identical or from the same subnet; if a feature has 
a list of values (e.g., all open ports reported by a scanning attack), the overlapping 
values among multiple lists can be considered when calculating similarity. The 
similarity value is between 0 and 1.  
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For each feature, if their similarity value is less than the corresponding 
predefined minimum similarity, then the overall similarity is 0; if the minimum 
similarity is satisfied, then the overall similarity is the weighted average of similarity 
values for those common features, where the weights are the expected similarity values 
for the corresponding features. The formula for overall similarity computation is 
defined as following: 
 
Figure 4.2. The formula for overall similarity computation. 
Where A and B are two alerts have n features in common, Ai and Bi are values 
for the common feature i in A and B, respectively, SIM(Ai, Bi) is the similarity between 
Ai and Bi, and Ei is the expected similarity value for feature i. 
Second approach focuses on port scanning detection to define the similarity of 
the measure; it can be extended to correlate other security events (Saniford, Hoagland 
and McAlerney 2002). In this approach, network packets are the primary information to 
be dealt with. To detect port scanning, feature data such as source IP addresses, 
destination IP addresses, and destination ports are extracted from network packets. The 
combinations of these features are also called events. The detection of port scanning can 
be performed into two steps. In the first step, an anomaly score A(x) is computed as 
A(x) = −log(P(x)), where x is an event, and P(x) is x’s probability value based on 
network traffic distribution. When the anomaly scores of events (network packets) are 
greater than certain thresholds, these events are passed to the second step. The general 
idea of the second step is to correlate events together, and the groups of events may be 
identified as portscans. The evaluation function computes the strength of connections 
between events. Given two events e1 and e2, the evaluation function is defined as   f (e1, 
e2) = c1h1(e1, e2)+c2h2(e1, e2)+· · ·+cjhj(e1, e2), after computing the strengths of 
connections, a set of events may be grouped if the strengths of connections between the 
events greater than a certain threshold. In addition, the anomaly score of each group is 
the summation of the anomaly scores of all events in the group. If the anomaly score of 
a group is greater than a threshold, a port scanning alert is reported to a security officer. 
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The other proposed one is an alert clustering approach for performing root cause 
analysis, where the root cause is the reason why the alerts are triggered (Julisch 2003). 
The root cause is an HTTP server with a broken TCP/IP stack which may trigger many 
fragmented IP alerts. The rationale of this approach is based on the observation. 
Although IDSs flag thousand of alerts every day, it is not uncommon that a few 
dominant root causes may trigger 90% of all alerts. Thus if security officers can identify 
these root causes (with the corresponding alerts), and remove these root causes, they can 
dramatically reduce the number of potential alerts in the future. 
In 2003, Qin and Lee proposed an alert correlation approach to performing 
statistical causality analysis. The focus of this approach is to conduct time series and 
statistical analysis to get attack scenarios, though Qin and Lee also propose clustering 
techniques to aggregate certain lower level alerts to a hyper alert (i.e., a group of alerts 
ordered by timestamps) thus potentially reduce the alert volume, and perform alert 
prioritization to identify important alerts (Qin and Lee 2003). 
Finally, there is one more approach to manage alerts in an environment with 
multiple IDSs. It is very possible to flag different alerts by using different IDSs, even 
for the same attack. Alert processing, which is related to MIRADOR project funded by 
the French DGA/CASSI, is divided into three steps in this approach: alert (base) 
management, alert clustering, and alert merging. In first step, alerts reported by different 
IDSs are transformed into records and then saved into relational databases. The second 
step is alert clustering. In this step, alerts reported by different IDSs are grouped into 
clusters so that the alerts in one cluster correspond to one attack. The critical part in this 
step is to identify similarity between alerts. The similarity is specified by an expert 
system which performs expert rules and these rules include classification, source, target, 
and time similarity actions. The third step of alert processing is alert merging, where the 
alerts in each cluster are merged, and a global alert is created with merged data. One of 
the critical points here is how to merge different attributes such as classification, source, 
target, and time information (Cuppens 2001). 
 
 4.1.2. Correlation Based on Predefined Attack Scenarios 
 
An attack scenario usually is a sequence of individual attack steps linked 
together to show an aggregated or global view of security threats. To build these attack 
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sequences, a straightforward way is to first predefine some attack scenario templates. 
For example, an attack sequence template may be specified where IP_Scan is followed 
by TCP_Port_Scan and then by FTP_Buffer_Overflow. Next, individual alerts reported 
by IDSs are matched to these scenario templates to construct attack scenarios. These 
approaches can help security officers to discover all scenarios where their 
corresponding patterns are aware of and predefined. However, sometimes it is not easy 
to exhaustively list all attack sequence templates. Another limitation of these methods is 
that once some novel attack patterns are created by attackers, the corresponding attack 
scenarios may not be recognized (Xu and Ning 2006). 
In a dynamic system, chronicles provide a mechanism to model event temporal 
patterns and monitor the system’s evolution. To specify a chronicle model, event 
patterns, related timestamp information, time constraints among events, as well as other 
patterns and actions will be used for modeling. Figure 4.2 shows an example of 
chronicles. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. An example of chronicles  
(Source: Xu and Ning 2006). 
 
In this chronicle, there events are considered port_scan, ftp_overflow, and 
remote_access, where their corresponding timestamps should be in increasing order 
(i.e., t1 <t2 <t3), and their corresponding domain attributes (i.e., source and target) 
should be equal. If all these patterns as well as constraints are satisfied, then this 
chronicle is recognized and a synthetic alert is generated. Notice that usually only 
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synthetic alerts will be reported to security officers. So this may significantly reduce the 
workload for security officers (Morin and Debar 2003). 
 
4.1.3. Correlation Based on Prerequisites and Consequence of Attacks 
 
This method correlates intrusion alerts using the prerequisites and consequences 
of attacks. Intuitively, the prerequisite of an attack is the necessary condition for the 
attack to be successful. For example, the existence of a vulnerable service is the 
prerequisite of a remote buffer overflow attack against the service. The consequence of 
an attack is the possible outcome of the attack, for instance, gaining certain privilege on 
a remote machine. In a series of attacks, there are usually connections between the 
consequences of the earlier attacks and the prerequisites of the later ones. Accordingly, 
the prerequisites and the consequences of attacks are identified and correlated the 
detected attacks (i.e., alerts) by matching the consequences of previous alerts to the 
prerequisites of later ones (Zhai, et al 2006). 
The correlation method uses logical formulas, which are logical combinations of 
predicates, to represent the prerequisites and consequences of attacks. The correlation 
model represents the attributes, prerequisites, and consequences of known attacks as 
alert types. The correlation process is to identify the preparation for relations between 
alerts, which is done with the help of prerequisite sets and expanded consequence sets 
of alerts. Given an alert, its prerequisite set is the set of all predicates in its own 
prerequisite, and its expanded consequence set is the set of all predicates in or implied 
by its consequence. An earlier alert t1 prepares for a later alert t2 if the expanded 
consequence set of t1 and the prerequisite set of t2 share some common predicates. An 
alert correlation graph is used to represent a set of correlated alerts. An alert correlation 
graph CG = (N, E) is a connected directed acyclic graph, where N is a set of alerts, and 
for each pair n1, n2 € N, there is a directed edge from n1 to n2 in E if and only if n1 
prepares for n2. 
The advantage of this method is that the correlation result is easy to understand 
and directly reflects the possible attack scenarios. However, as the correlation is solely 
based on IDS alerts, the result highly depends on the quality of the IDS alerts. For 
example, the result may contain false correlations when there are false alerts. 
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4.2. Integrating Alert Correlation and OS-Level Dependency Tracking 
 
A different aspect of alert correlation which based on multiple information 
sources to identify the relevancy between the relationships among IDS alerts and the 
dependencies among OS-level objects, and then use the OS-level objects, and then the 
OS-level dependencies to verify or discover the relationships among IDS alerts. To 
identify such relationships, first the attacks’ OS-level behaviors are looked into. 
From the operating system’s point of view, an attack is a set of OS-level events 
that access or modify a set of system objects. The OS-level objects and operations 
corresponding to an attack can be derived from the semantics of the attack. For 
example, such semantics consist of two parts: one is the prerequisites and consequences 
of attacks, and the other is the correspondence between the predicates in attacks 
prerequisites or consequences and the OS-level objects on the host. With such 
information, the OS-level objects can be identified the corresponding to the attacks on 
the host. In other words, given an attack that exploits a vulnerable service as its 
prerequisite and yields a shell as its consequence, the corresponding service process and 
shell process can be identified. 
Accordingly, the OS-level objects corresponding to an attack can be divided into 
two sets: the prerequisite object set, which are the objects derived from the attack’s 
prerequisite, and the consequence object set, which are the objects derived from the 
attack’s consequence. These two sets may overlap, because some attacks’ consequences 
may affect their prerequisite objects. By monitoring among the OS-level objects, the 
dependencies among those objects at the OS-level can also be found. Though different 
from the preparation for relation used in alert correlation, such OS-level dependencies 
can be utilized to verify or discover the preparation for relations among the alerts (Zhai, 
et al. 2006). 
In essence, first necessary information from the alerts is extracted to identify the 
corresponding OS-level objects. Then the dependencies among alerts are verified by 
using the OS-level dependencies among their corresponding objects, and thus the alert 
correlation based on the causal relationship is improved. Moreover, by identifying the 
OS-level objects corresponding to the evidence of possibly are missed attacks, and 
tracking back from those objects, the performance of existing methods can be improved 
for hypothesizing about possibly missed attacks. 
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An attack has to have impacts on the local system in order to be observable in 
the OS-level log. Thus, OS-level dependency tracking guarantees improvement of alert 
correlation for the alerts of successful attacks, though it may provide positive results 
from some failed attack attempts. 
How to find the OS-level objects accessed by the attacks which trigger IDS 
alerts is discussed now. This process is called the mapping of IDS alerts to OS-level 
objects. The semantics carried by an alert that can be used to identify the corresponding 
OS-level objects are summarized below. Firstly, an IDS alert comes with a timestamp, 
which indicates when the attack happens. Secondly, given alert has the knowledge 
about how the attack works and how the system should behave in response to it. For 
example, given a Snort alert “FTP EXPLOIT wu-ftpd 2.6.0” and the corresponding 
attack exploits a vulnerable wu-ftpd server and forks a root shell. Finally, given local 
system’s configuration can be identified that the OS-level objects correspond to each 
predicate in attacks’ prerequisites and consequences (Zhai, et al. 2006). For example, a 
predicate “Samba server” may correspond to “/usr/sbin/smbd” process on a given 
computer. How each type of knowledge used to map the alerts is discussed below. 
Though the number of logged events and objects is large in system logs, the 
timestamp of each alert can be used to easily narrow down the potentially relevant 
system objects. Given the timestamp of an alert, an approximate time window can be 
estimated during which all the relevant OS-level activities occur, and then narrow down 
the scope of OS-level objects that need to be examined. 
Given the name of an alert, the prerequisite of the corresponding attack and the 
knowledge of the consequence predicates from experts is known. Each of those 
predicates is associated with some OS-level objects such as services, processes, and 
files. Thus, for each predicate in attacks’ prerequisites and consequences, the 
corresponding file or process can be identified on the host computer, and represent them 
as (predicate, OS-level object) pairs in the knowledge base. For example, given a pair 
(Samba_service(host_IP),”/usr/sbin/smbd”) in the knowledge base, whenever there is 
predicate of Samba_service(host_IP), its corresponding process of ”/usr/sbin/smbd”can 
be located. Thus, after identifying the predicates in an attack’s prerequisite and 
consequence, the OS-level objects can be identified from the corresponding to those 
predicates on the host computer.  
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4.3. Alert Correlation Graphs 
 
Alert correlation and analysis is a critical task in security management. Several 
techniques and approaches have been proposed to correlate and analyze security alerts, 
most of them focus on the aggregation and analysis of raw security alerts, and build 
attack scenarios (Al-Mamory and Zhang 2007). 
The correlation between alerts can be represented as a directed acyclic graph 
ACG (Alert Correlation Graph) = (N, E) where N is a set of nodes representing alerts. 
For each pair of nodes n1 and n2 € N, there is an edge from n1 to n2 if n1 prepares for 
n2. In other words, the ACG provides an intuitive representation of correlated alerts, 
reveals the intrusion strategies behind the attacks, and leads to better understanding of 
the attacker’s intention (Al-Mamory and Zhang 2007). 
An interesting method is the work of Ning et al. An alert correlation model 
proposed which based on the observation that most intrusions consist of many stages, 
with the early stages preparing for the later ones. Alerts collected from NIDS, correlated 
off-line, and tried to draw big picture (through ACGs) of what happens in the network. 
The resulted ACGs show that the proposed system can correlate related alerts, uncover 
the attack strategies, and can effectively simplify the analysis of large amounts of alerts 
(Ning, et al. 2004). 
The above method generates ACGs depending on pre and post conditions of 
individual alerts. The correlation model is build upon two aspects of intrusions that are, 
Prerequisites (the necessary conditions for an intrusion to be successful) and 
Consequences (the possible outcome of an intrusion). With knowledge of prerequisites 
and consequences, the correlation model can correlate related alerts by finding causal 
relationships between them. They used hyper alert correlation graphs to visually 
represent the alerts, where each node represents a hyper alert and the edges represents 
preparation for relation (Al-Mamory and Zhang 2007). 
A hyper alert type T is a triple (fact, prerequisite, consequence), where fact 
denotes the kind of information reported with the alert, prerequisite specifies what must 
be true for the attack to be successful, consequence describes what is true if the attack 
indeed succeeds. An hyper alert instantiates its prerequisite and consequence by 
replacing the free variables with their specific values and adds an interval based 
timestamp: [begin_time, end_time]. Given a hyper alert type, a hyper alert instance 
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(hyper alert) can be generated if the corresponding attack is detected and reported by an 
IDS. For example, we can generate a hyper alert instance of type SadminBufferOverflow 
from a corresponding alert. The notion of hyper alert instance is formally defined as 
follows. An hyper alert h1 prepares for hyper alert h2, if the end time of all the 
prerequisite events of h2 found in the consequences of h1 occurred earlier ? 
(h1.end_time  < h2.begin_time) (Ning, et al. 2002): 
 
Hyper-alert Type SadmindBufferOverflow =({VictimIP, VictimPort}, 
ExistHost(VictimIP)^VulnerableSadmind(VictimIP), GainRootAccess(VictimIP))  
Hyper-alert hSadmindBOF ={(VictimIP = 152.1.19.5, VictimPort = 1235), 
 (VictimIP = 152.1.19.7, VictimPort = 1235)}  
 
The preparation for relation between hyper alerts provides a natural way to 
represent the causal relationship between correlated hyper alerts. A hyper alert 
correlation graph represents attack scenarios on the basis of the preparation for relation. 
For example, if an IDS detects a DDOS daemon running on a host, it would be helpful 
to inform the administrator how this happened, that is, report all the alerts that directly 
or indirectly preparation for the DDOS daemon (Ning, et al. 2002).  
The pseudo code of the proposed algorithm that builds ACG is shown in Figure 
4.3: 
Figure 4.4. Pseudo-code of graph generation algorithm  
(Source: Ning, et al. 2002). 
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In Figure 4.4, an intrusion alert correlator using the preparation for correlation 
model. The implementation of the correlator assumes the alerts reported by IDSs are 
stored in the database. Using the information in the knowledge base, the alert 
preprocessor generates hyper alerts as well as auxiliary data from the original alerts. 
The correlation engine then performs the actual correlation task using the hyper alerts 
and the auxiliary data. After alert correlation, the hyper alert correlation graph generator 
extracts the correlated alerts from database, and generates the graph files in the format 
accepted by GraphViz. As the final step of alert correlation, GraphViz is used to 
visualize the hyper alert correlation graphs. 
Figure 4.5. The architecture of the intrusion alert correlator  
(Source: Ning, et al. 2002). 
 
Figure 4.5 shows one of the hyper alert correlation graphs discovered from the 
2000 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation datasets (Ning and Cui 2002). Each node 
in Figure 4.5 represents a hyper alert. The numbers inside the nodes are the alert IDs 
generated by the IDS. This hyper alert correlation graph clearly shows the strategy 
behind the sequence of attacks. 
 
Figure 4.6. A hyper alert correlation graph discovered in the 2000 DARPA 
intrusion detection evaluation datasets (Source: Ning and Cui 2002). 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE AND EXPERIMENTAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
  
5.1. The Architecture of the Intrusion Alert Correlation 
 
As discussed earlier, our goal is to improve alert analysis by integrating OS-level 
event logging and object dependency tracking into IDS alert correlation. In this chapter, 
a brief introduction is given to the alert correlation and OS-level dependency tracking 
techniques to be used in our method. For alert correlation, the method used is based on 
the prerequisite of the attack and consequence, due to the ease to make connections 
between alert correlation and OS-level objects in this method. 
In this section, an explanation of the proposed architecture is given. The 
proposed architecture (Figure 5.1) contains an Ubuntu 9.04 server with an IP number 
10.1.1.164 which hosts a Snort 2.8.4 IDS and Coral8 5.6.0 Correlation Engine and acts 
as an IDS Alert Correlation Server in TurkDex network. Ubuntu 9.04 monitors specific 
types of OS-level objects, i.e., processes and files. The objects are kept in a log with 
their properties of the objects. It also monitors specific dependency-causing system calls 
like process forking, file reading, and memory sharing, which together are called “high-
control events”. One vulnerable service running on the server: Samba 3.0 as files and 
printers sharing service.  Snort 2.8.4 was installed on the server to monitor the network 
traffic as an IDS sensor. To detect attacks, the rules set used with Snort. Both Ubuntu 
9.04 OS-level objects and Snort alerts are integrated to Coral8 Correlation Engine via 
“/var/log/snort/syslogFormatted.csv” and “/var/log/snort/csv_alert.csv” respectively to 
correlate the alerts and OS-level objects. 
The background traffic is injected during the experiments to mimic an 
operational network. The background traffic was collected on the target machine when 
it was connected to the TurkDex network, and was manually verified to contain no 
attacks toward the target machine. Some attack attempts are also injected by using 
Nessus 4.0 vulnerability scanning server.  
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Figure 5.1. TurkDex network structure  
(Source: TurkDex 2009).
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The operating system of IDS alert correlation server is Ubuntu 9.04. Snort 2.8.4 
IDS, Coral8 5.6.0 complex event processing engine server and studio, Samba 3.0 files 
and printers sharing service, and Nessus 4.0 vulnerability scanning server need to be 
installed. 
First, the Ubuntu 9.04 Desktop ISO image that corresponds to our hardware 
architecture i386 is needed and which can be downloaded from www.ubuntu.com. 
When the download is over, burn the ISO image with a CD/DVD burning application 
on a blank CD at 8x speed. Leave and reinsert the CD in your CD/DVD-ROM device 
and reboot the server in order to boot from the CD. Follow the default installation steps 
and then the Ubuntu 9.04 operating system will be installed. 
The second step is to set up Snort 2.8.4 IDS on Ubuntu 9.04 OS. 
# sudo –s  
Type “1234” root password to install service or programs on the Ubuntu. 
# apt-get install snort 2.8.4 
At the end of Snort’s installation routine, you will be prompted if you wish to set 
up a database for use with Snort. Choose no. The Snort manually configured. The Snort 
output logs located into “/var/log/snort/csv_alert.csv” so that to integrate the output logs 
with Coral8 CEP engine. To set the output log file edit the snort.conf file.  
# vi /etc/snort/snort.conf 
At the line number 791 within Snort.conf file, write the output type and fields 
of the snort output logs like the following line comment: 
output alert_csv: csv_alert.csv timestamp, src, srcport, dst, dstport, msg 
# /etc/init.d/snort start  
When you start the Snort IDS by the above command and which starts logging 
the alerts into “/var/log/snort/csv_alert.csv” file. 
Installation instructions are listed below for Coral8 CEP engine server and 
studio. 
Download and unpack the installation tar-files using the tar command: 
# tar xvfz coral8-server-5.6.0.tar.gz 
# tar xvfz coral8-studio.5.6.0.tar.gz 
1. Configure the Coral8 server by install-server.sh script file: 
# sh ./coral8/install-server.sh 
2. Start the Coral8 server using the following command: 
# ./coral8/server/coral8-server.rc start 
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3. Start the Coral8 studio using the following script command: 
# ./coral8/studio/coral8-studio.sh 
The next step is to setup a script file which writes the Ubuntu 9.04 system logs 
into “/var/log/snort/syslogFormatted.csv” simultaneously. The script file “startSnort.sh” 
located in “/usr/local/bin” and which includes the following linux commands: 
#/bin/bash 
SNORT_PATH=/var/log/snort 
touch $SNORT_PATH/syslogFormatted.csv 
echo "syslogFormatted.csv created." 
echo "month, day, time, hostname, message" > 
$SNORT_PATH/syslogFormatted.csv 
echo "waiting for syslog..." 
tail -f /var/log/syslog | sed 's/\([a-z]*\) \([0-9]*\) \([0-9]*:[0-9]*:[0-9]*\) \([a-
zA-Z]*\) /\1,\2,\3,\4,/' >> $SNORT_PATH/syslogFormatted.csv 
Samba 3.0 files and printers sharing service should be installed on the server to 
provide a vulnerable service to log system calls into syslogFormatted.csv and to detect 
attacks by the Snort IDS. 
# sudo -s 
# apt-get install samba 
# /etc/init.d/samba start 
At the last step of the server installation, the Nessus 4.0 installed which is one of 
the best vulnerability scanners provided by www.nesus.org. The Nessus 4.0 can be 
installed on Ubuntu 9.04 by following linux commands: 
# sudo –s 
# apt-get install nessusd nessus nessus-plugins 
# /etc/init.d/nessusd start 
 58
  
Figure 5.2. Security monitoring by using IDS alert correlation server. 
 
5.2. Details of Alert Correlation Scenario 
 
The attack scenario exploits a vulnerable Samba server. It includes the following 
attack steps: First, two remote buffer overflow attack attempts are exploited the 
vulnerable Samba server. Second, a server daemon of a DDoS is uploaded and started 
by Nessus vulnerability scanner on the target host. Lastly, Nessus client program is used 
to direct the Nessus server daemon on the victim server to start SYN flood and UDP 
flood attacks against another computer (Zhai, et al. 2006). 
The above attacks took about 5 minutes. During the period, Ubuntu 9.04 logged 
81.613 events. Moreover, the Snort sensor raised 9 “NETBIOS SMB trans2open buffer 
overflow attempt” (“smb-bof”) alerts, 15 “DDOS tfn2k icmp possible communication” 
(“tfn2k-icmp”) alerts, and 2 “ATTACK-RESPONSES id check returned root” (“id-
root”) alerts. The background traffic triggered 32 alerts related to the target server, 
which include 8 “SCAN nmap TCP” (“nmap-tcp”) alerts, 23 “SNMP public access udp” 
(“snmp-udp”) alerts, and 1 “FTP EXPLOIT wu-ftpd 2.6.0 site exec format string 
overflow Linux” (“wuftp-fs”) alert. Among the 3 types of alerts, the third one is 
triggered by the failed attempt of wu-ftpd buffer overflow attack injected into the 
background traffic. 
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5.3. Experimental Results 
 
Using the alert correlation method proposed in (Ning, Cui and Reeves 2002), the 
correlation graph generated shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3. The correlation graph. 
 
In this alert correlation method, the encoded prerequisite and expanded 
consequence sets in two Coral8 input adapters are stored, PrereqSet and 
ExpandedConseqSet, along with the corresponding hyper-alert ID and timestamp, 
assuming that each hyper-alert is uniquely identified by its ID. Both input adapters have 
attributes HyperAlertID, EncodedPredicate, begin_time, and end_time, with meanings 
as indicated by their names. As a result, alert correlation can be performed using the 
following SQL statement on the Coral8 studio which is executed by the Coral8 engine. 
 
SELECT DISTINCT c.HyperAlertID, p.HyperAlertID 
FROM PrereqSet p, ExpandedConseqSet c 
WHERE p.EncodedPredicate = c.EncodedPredicate  
AND c.end_time < p.begin_time 
 
The correctness of our implementation method is guaranteed by the following 
theorem: 
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Theorem 1. Under assumptions 1 and 2, the implementation method discovers 
all and only hyper-alert pairs such that the first one of the pair preparation for the 
second one (Ning, et al. 2002). 
Obviously, the result of the correlation contains many false correlations due to 
the false positives within the alerts. Using the operating system’s log and the semantics 
of these alerts, mapped these alerts to a number of OS-level objects, as listed in Figure 
5.4. 
 Figure 5.4. OS-level objects corresponding to the alerts in the alert correlation scenario 
(Source: Ning, et al. 2002). 
 
For each alert prepared by other alerts, the generated Ubuntu 9.04 dependency 
graphs by tracking back from their prerequisite objects are shown in Figure 5.3. In these 
graphs, it is looked for paths from the earlier alerts’ consequence objects to a later 
alert’s prerequisite objects if the former prepares for the alert. For example, when such a 
path exists, the two alerts are strongly connected and thus the correlations between them 
are verified at the OS-level. Otherwise, the correlation would be considered false. In 
this way, each of the correlations can be verified in the original graph, remove those that 
are verified to be false and finally come up with a new correlation graph. The new 
correlation graph for the scenario is shown in Figure 5.5, it can be seen it is the correct 
correlation graph of the reported Snort alerts based on the actual attack scenario.  
 61
 
Figure 5.5. The alert correlation graphs (Source: Ning, et al. 2002). 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
  
In this thesis, a series of techniques defined to integrate the alert correlation 
method and examined the technique which based on prerequisites and consequences of 
attacks and OS-level dependency tracking. A critical step in this integration is to 
establish input adapters to Coral8 complex event processing engine with IDS alerts and 
OS-level objects and to perform the SQL statement of the alert correlation method into 
Coral8 engine via Coral8 studio. A number of constraints identified that the OS-level 
objects should satisfy if they are relevant to the IDS alerts (or attacks) that are 
correlated. By using these constraints, the IDS alerts verified as well as the correlation 
between IDS alerts and reduced false correlations. Moreover, the dependency between 
OS-level objects can also facilitate the hypotheses of attacks possibly missed by the 
IDSs. The experimental evaluation gave favorable results, showing that OS-level 
dependency tracking can significantly reduce false correlations when integrated with the 
alert correlation method. 
Several issues are worth for future research. In particular, self-learning alert 
correlation systems would be the most applicable products for the information security 
industry. The alert correlation will certainly help the system analyst in identifying the 
intrusion by concentrating on the groups of alerts that are relevant with each other. By 
using artificial intelligence techniques for clustering the alerts automatically by giving 
inputs of such features which are extracted from generated alerts.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
CSV ALERT LOGS 
 
Table A.1. Alert Logs 
10/06-
14:13:16.813679  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 10.1.1.100 1600 10.1.1.49 1633
10/06-
14:13:18.180317  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 10.1.1.100 1600 10.1.1.127 1093
10/06-
14:13:18.685073  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 10.1.1.4 52324 10.1.1.18 445
10/06-
14:13:18.685585  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 10.1.1.4 52324 10.1.1.18 445
10/06-
14:13:18.747273  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 10.1.1.100 1600 10.1.1.125 1699
10/06-
14:13:20.317846  
SNMP public access 
udp UDP 10.1.1.67 64186 10.1.1.13 161
10/06-
14:13:20.317846  SNMP request udp UDP 10.1.1.67 64186 10.1.1.13 161
10/06-
14:13:20.323481  
SNMP public access 
udp UDP 10.1.1.67 64186 10.1.1.13 161
10/06-
14:13:20.323481  SNMP request udp UDP 10.1.1.67 64186 10.1.1.13 161
10/06-
14:13:20.340528  
SNMP public access 
udp UDP 10.1.1.67 64186 10.1.1.13 161
10/06-
14:13:20.340528  SNMP request udp UDP 10.1.1.67 64186 10.1.1.13 161
10/06-
14:13:20.354223  
SNMP public access 
udp UDP 10.1.1.67 64186 10.1.1.13 161
10/06-
14:13:20.354223  SNMP request udp UDP 10.1.1.67 64186 10.1.1.13 161
10/06-
14:13:21.565185  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 213.139.216.130 443 10.1.1.27 3050
10/06-
14:13:28.893088  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 192.168.240.19 80 10.1.1.191 52770
10/06-
14:13:28.893092  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 192.168.240.19 80 10.1.1.191 52770
10/06-
14:13:28.893806  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 192.168.240.19 80 10.1.1.191 52771
10/06-
14:13:28.894589  
SMB Server 
daemon access TCP 192.168.240.19 80 10.1.1.191 52771
 
